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Why do teenagers do “stupid” things? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Excerpt from Manuscript Appearing in Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B., November 2004 One’s abilities to imagine alternative outcomes and understand the consequences of those outcomes are an essential component of human reasoning. Such counterfactual thinking typically involves imagining a set of circumstances leading up to an event that may have had a different outcome if only a critical preceding event did not take place. For example, consider the case in which an individual runs over a pedestrian while taking an alternative route home to drop off a coworker. Had the coworker not requested a ride home, the driver may not have taken the alternate route, and thus not struck the pedestrian. Given this set of circumstances, an individual can mutate the events preceding the outcome and judge the degree to which certain mutations could change the outcome (e.g., the consequences of their behavior). The legal system places great emphasis on this type of reasoning in that it demands both judges and jurors use counterfactual thinking when determining the degree to which a particular person or event was responsible for a particular outcome (Spellman & Kincannon, 2001). This of course raises several critical issues relating to the extent and efficiency with which people are able to reason counterfactually. These issues are relevant not only to the processes by which judges and jurors engage in counterfactual reasoning, but also relate to the extent to which defendants may be seen as liable for their actions. In the present paper we will focus on this latter issue, with particular emphasis on its relevance to the developing adolescent. Specifically, we delineate, (1) the role that counterfactual thinking plays in reasoning about the consequences of one’s actions, (2) the neural substrates for counterfactual reasoning, and (3) the limits with which brain maturation places on the ability to successful reason counterfactual by adolescents. Furthermore, we propose a brain-based model that provides a framework for incorporating the cognitive and neural architecture of counterfactual thought, especially as it pertains to the developing mind. Finally, we suggest possible implications of developmental differences in counterfactual thought as they specifically apply to the juvenile justice system. |
