In a best-selling book from a few years ago, a college teacher remarked,

"There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative. If this belief is put to the test, one can count on the students' reaction: they will be uncomprehending. That anyone should regard the proposition as not self-evident astonishes them, as though you were calling into question 2+2=4."¹

Many teachers would echo this observation, especially as it relates to ethical relativism. However, philosophers know that ethical relativism is a frequently misunderstood doctrine. In other words, people often describe their position as "ethical relativism" when it is really something quite different, or (worse yet) people conflate ethical relativism with some other doctrine, so that they end up holding some self-contradictory combination of views. As a consequence of these facts, people also frequently give arguments that they think support ethical relativism, but that really support some very different position. Therefore, what I want to do in this paper is to explain clearly what ethical relativism is, identify some other positions with which ethical relativism is often confused, and discuss some good and bad arguments in favor of (and against) ethical relativism.

As my title suggests, this will be an opinionated introduction to this topic, because I will not hesitate to argue in favor of my own views. (As you will see, I think ethical relativism is false.) I think this is more honest than feigning disinterest. However, as a teacher of philosophy, I am not here to demand that you agree with my opinions. I am here to make sure that you clearly understand what the various philosophical options are, and that you can recognize good and bad arguments for the various positions. Consequently, I would rather see you argue clearly and well against the views I share, than have you argue vaguely or poorly in favor of my own position.

There are actually a variety of different kinds of relativism. Speaking at the most general level, relativism is the doctrine that a claim is true or false only in relation to some particular viewpoint or perspective. Specific kinds of relativism may be distinguished according to (1) which kinds of claims the doctrine of relativism applies to, and (2) which viewpoint or perspective these claims are relative to.

What Kinds of Claims Does Relativism Apply To?

Relativism applied to ethical claims is called, sensibly enough, "ethical relativism." Ethical relativism is also known as "moral relativism."² (In addition, some people refer to this doctrine as "meta-ethical relativism," to distinguish it from "normative moral relativism," which I shall discuss below.) Ethical relativism is the doctrine that all ethical claims are true or false only in relation to some particular viewpoint or perspective. Ethical claims are the ones that involve evaluations of some kind. So if I say, "You ought to do such-and-such," or "It would be wrong to do such-and-such," or "So-and-so is a kind person," or "It would be bad if such-and-such happened," then I am making an ethical or evaluative claim.³ Let's look at an example. Consider a claim like, "Nazism is wrong." If we ask whether this claim is true or false, an ethical relativist, if she is being careful, will say that we cannot say that the statement is true or false until we specify a perspective from which we can evaluate that claim. Relative to the perspective of Adolph Hitler, Nazism is right. Relative to my perspective (and, I hope, your perspective) Nazism is wrong.

I want to head off a possible misunderstanding here. The ethical relativist is not asserting only that Hitler believed that Nazism is right, while you and I believe that Nazism is wrong. Rather, the ethical relativist is asserting that Nazism really is right, relative to Hitler's perspective, and that it really is wrong, relative to your and my viewpoints. But there is no fact of the matter about whether Nazism is wrong, independent of particular viewpoints or perspectives.

Ethical relativism takes one group of claims that humans make (the ethical or evaluative ones), and says that these claims are true or false only relative to some perspective or viewpoint. But there are many other kinds of claims that we make: "2+2=4," "e=mc²," "Van Norden is a Professor at Vassar," etc.
Cognitive relativism expands the relativist doctrine to encompass not just evaluative claims, but also claims that are purely descriptive, or non-evaluative. Cognitive relativism is the doctrine that all claims are true or false only in relation to some particular viewpoint or perspective. For example, consider the paper you are holding in your hands. A contemporary physicist would say that this paper is made mostly out of wood pulp, which is mostly made of carbon atoms. In contrast, a pre-modern Aristotelian physicist -- that is, a pre-modern scientist who accepted the physics of Aristotle -- would say that there are four basic elements that compose things in the mundane world: earth, water, fire, and air. Thus, the Aristotelian physicist would believe that the paper you are holding is made out of some combination of earth, water, fire, and air. So the modern physicist and the Aristotelian physicist believe different things. But the cognitive relativist goes beyond that, and asserts that, relative to the perspective of the modern physicist, the paper really is made out of mostly carbon atoms, and -- at the same time -- the paper really is made out of the basic elements of earth, water, fire, and air, relative to the perspective of the Aristotelian physicist. In other words, there is no fact of the matter, independent of perspective, about what this particular piece of paper is made of. Even a descriptive claim like, "This piece of paper is made mostly of carbon atoms" is true or false only relative to some particular viewpoint or perspective.

In this paper, I'm going to focus on ethical relativism. However, I want to briefly sketch why many philosophers would say that cognitive relativism is a very problematic doctrine, and is very difficult to defend. One of the classic objections to cognitive relativism is that it is self-contradictory.⁴ In order to see the problem here, think about what happens when we apply the doctrine of cognitive relativism to itself. In other words, is the doctrine of cognitive relativism itself only true or false in relation to some particular perspective? Either way you answer this question seems to land you in problems. Let's look at two brief dialogues to illustrate why.

Dialogue One

A: "Is cognitive relativism itself only true relative to a perspective?"
B: "No."
A: "You have contradicted yourself, because cognitive relativism says that all doctrines are true or false only relative to some perspective, but you just claimed that cognitive relativism itself is true objectively."
B: "The doctrine of cognitive relativism is the one exception to the doctrine that all claims are only relatively true."
A: "That seems ad hoc. What is so special about the doctrine of cognitive relativism that makes it the one, unique doctrine that is immune from relativism?"

Dialogue Two

A: "Is cognitive relativism itself only true relative to a perspective?"
B: "Yes."
A: "So there is a perspective relative to which cognitive relativism is false."
B: "Yes, that follows logically from what I have said."
A: "So there is a perspective relative to which truth is not relative to a perspective?"
B: "Yes, that also follows from what I have said."
A: "You have now contradicted yourself. Relativism is based on the belief that there are a multitude of perspectives that are equally justified when considered objectively. But what you have now admitted is that there is a true perspective from which other perspectives are not equally justified when considered objectively."

Despite its problems, there are some philosophers who try to defend cognitive relativism, such as Nelson Goodman in his Ways of Worldmaking. In addition, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has been read as a defense of cognitive relativism (although Kuhn himself later argued that this was a misreading of his work).⁵ However, I think the problems with cognitive relativism are so evident that I shall focus on ethical relativism in this paper.

What Viewpoints Are the Claims Relative To?

As I said earlier, specific kinds of relativism may be distinguished according to which kinds of claims the doctrine of relativism applies to, and according to which viewpoint or perspective these claims are relative to. So far, we have seen that relativism can apply to evaluative claims (ethical relativism) or to claims in general, including purely descriptive ones (cognitive relativism). Now, we will look at which viewpoints these claims can be relative to. Basically, a claim can be relative to the viewpoint of a particular culture, or a particular individual. Cultural relativism is the doctrine that a claim is true of false only relative to the perspective or viewpoint of a given culture. Subjectivism is the doctrine that a claim is true of false only relative to the perspective or viewpoint of a given person. Combining this with our earlier distinction, we get four possibilities:
 

So one can advocate either cultural ethical relativism (A), or subjective ethical relativism (B), and one can advocate either cultural cognitive relativism (C), or subjective cognitive relativism (D). For instance, an ethical subjectivist (B) holds that ethical claims (e.g., "murder is wrong") are true or false only in relation to each individual person's perspective (e.g., Hitler's or Gandhi's), while a cognitive cultural relativist (C) holds that claims in general (e.g., "an object in motion will tend to remain in motion unless acted on by some force") are true of false only in relation to the viewpoint of a particular culture (e.g., the culture of contemporary physicists, or the culture of medieval Aristotelian physicists).

The kind of ethical relativism which I think most students initially find appealing is subjectivism, so I will focus on that kind for the remainder of this paper.

What Are the Alternatives to Ethical Relativism?

There are a variety of philosophical positions opposed to ethical relativism. As I have defined relativism, it holds that ethical claims are either true or false. But some philosophers have argued that ethical claims are neither true nor false. In its simplest formulations, this position argues that a statement like "Murder is wrong" is like an interjection such as "Boo murder!" or "Down with murder!" If you think about it, you'll realize that interjections like "Yea!" or "Go Cubs!" or "Viva Zapata!" are neither true nor false. The position that ethical 'claims' are expressions of emotions (and hence are neither true nor false) is emotivism.⁶ One of the most serious problems with emotivism is that it makes it hard to justify the way we actually talk about ethical issues. Consider the following example:

P1: Murder is always wrong.
P2: What Cain did to Abel was murder.
C: What Cain did to Abel was wrong.

I think most of us would say that this is a good (if simple) ethical argument. But a philosopher would analyze this by saying that, if the premises (P1 and P2) are true, then the conclusion (C) must be true. An emotivist, though, must understand the above argument as something like the following:

P1: Boo murder!
P2: What Cain did to Abel was murder.
C: Boo what Cain did to Abel!

And, according to emotivism, neither P1 nor C is true (or false). So our standard accounts of reasoning do not, according to the emotivist, apply to ethics. Consequently, emotivists must offer an alternative account of how reasoning in ethics works without truth or falsity. So far, none has offered an account that convinces most philosophers.

Of course, many philosophers reject both emotivism and ethical relativism. One alternative position is ethical realism, also sometimes called "ethical objectivism."⁷ Ethical objectivism is the doctrine that there are true evaluative claims whose truth does not depend on the viewpoint of particular individuals or cultures. Here is a subtle point: notice that anti-objectivism is not the same as relativism. An emotivist, for example, is opposed to objectivism, but also denies relativism.

As I suggested at the beginning of this paper, some people assume that ethical relativism is true, and seem somewhat surprised that any argument is needed in defense of it. I ask people like these to consider the following facts. I have studied the history of Western thought, and based on my study, I can tell you the following: There have been a few ethical relativists in the Western tradition. One noteworthy example is Protagoras, a Greek Sophist who is famous for having said, "Humans are the measure of all things." Historians argue about what exactly Protagoras meant by that claim, but one common view is that Protagoras was defending a kind of relativism.⁸  However, historically speaking, Protagoras is a rare exception in the Western tradition. In fact, almost no one in the Western intellectual tradition has been an ethical relativist. The fact that almost none of the great philosophers, poets, and religious leaders of the West for over two millennia have been ethical relativists should make us pause and think a moment.
Some people will not be surprised by this fact. Some people are aware that ethical relativism is a rare doctrine in the Western tradition, but they think that this is precisely the problem with the Western tradition. Such people advocate adopting ethical relativism as a way of overthrowing the Western tradition. But consider another fact. I have also studied several non-Western traditions. No one is an expert in every non-Western culture. However, I have studied the Chinese tradition in depth, and the Japanese, Korean and Indian philosophical traditions to a lesser extent. Based on that study, I can tell you that, if anything, ethical relativism is even less common in these non-Western traditions than it is in the West. Consequently, if you believe in ethical relativism, you are disagreeing with the major thinkers of not just the Western tradition, but of at least several major non-Western traditions as well.

Of course, it is fine to disagree with people. And it is possible for even great thinkers to be wrong. (Most of a philosophy class is spent discussing where we disagree with great thinkers!) But what the preceding facts should demonstrate conclusively is the following: it is not obvious that ethical relativism is true, because if it were obvious, there would not have been so few ethical relativists among the great thinkers of so many traditions. Consequently, if ethical relativism is true, this must be shown by means of philosophical argument, and not just assumed, or taken to be obvious.
 

Philosophically, an argument consists of premises which are supposed to provide evidence for a conclusion. The conclusion is what you are trying to convince your audience is true, and the premises are things you think they already believe are true, and which somehow give us a good reason to believe that the conclusion is true. "Non-sequitur" (nawn SEK-kwi-ter) is the name of the philosophical error of offering premises which do not logically support the conclusion at all. In other words, if your argument is a non-sequitur, whether the premises are true or not, they provide no evidence for accepting the conclusion, because the conclusion is not logically related to the premises.

As I noted at the beginning of this paper, ethical relativism is often confused with other doctrines. Consequently, people often offer what they think are arguments in favor of ethical relativism, but which are really arguments in favor of some other position. Arguments like these are "non-sequiturs." In this section, we are going to examine some examples of this sort of non-sequitur, because it will help us to identify some bad arguments for ethical relativism, and also because we will understand ethical relativism better by understanding what it is not.

Ethical Relativism Is Not Moral Isolationism

"Ethical relativism is true because we have no right to pass judgment on other cultures."
The conclusion here is that ethical relativism is true. The premise, which is supposed to provide evidence for the truth of the conclusion, is that we have no right to pass judgment on other cultures. Does the premise actually provide evidence for the conclusion? I don't think so; I think this is a non-sequitur. Why? The problem with the argument above is that the truth of its premise is perfectly consistent with the denial of ethical relativism. In order to see why, ask yourself the following question: Could an ethical realist (or an ethical objectivist) agree with the premise that we have no right to pass judgment on other cultures? Surely she could. Indeed, an ethical realist could say that it is an objective matter of fact that we have no right to pass judgment on other cultures.⁹ But recall that ethical realism denies the truth of ethical relativism. So the premise in the above argument does not logically imply the conclusion that ethical relativism is true, because the premise is equally consistent with ethical relativism being false.
Another way of seeing the problem with the argument is to notice that the premise, "We have no right to pass judgment on other cultures," is an ethical claim. However, ethical relativism itself is not an ethical claim. Ethical relativism is a claim about the nature of ethical claims. So the premise and the conclusion here are really about different topics altogether.

The premise of this argument actually expresses moral isolationism, a doctrine very different from ethical relativism. Moral isolationism is the doctrine that one ought not make ethical judgments about individuals or practices in any culture other than one's own. The philosopher Mary Midgley coined this label. (Some other philosophers call this "normative moral relativism.") Midgley presents some strong arguments against moral isolationism in a famous essay, "Trying Out One's New Sword."¹⁰ Midgley agrees that we should not pass judgments on other cultures glibly, or if we are uninformed. But, she asks, why can't we judge other cultures if we are informed and open-minded about their practices? In addition, Midgley suggests that, given the increasing interactions and exchanges among cultures, it is impossible to live up to moral isolationism. Practically speaking, we are forced to make judgments about other cultures all the time. (For example, how can I decide whether I support increasing trade with the People's Republic of China unless I make a judgment about whether trade with the West will make the Chinese government morally better or worse?)

We saw above that moral isolationism does not logically imply ethical relativism. Notice also that ethical relativism does not, by itself, imply moral isolationism. According to subjectivism, for example, moral isolationism is true relative to the people who accept that claim, but false relative to the people who reject that claim. If I am a subjectivist, I could think that we have no right to pass judgment on other cultures, but I could also (while still being a subjectivist) think that we do have a right to pass judgment on other cultures. So the truth of moral isolationism and the truth of ethical relativism are not tied together in any way.

Ethical Relativism Is Not Liberalism

"Ethical relativism is true because we have no right to interfere in the lives of others, even if we disapprove of what they are doing."

Here the premise that is supposed to support ethical relativism is that we have no right to interfere in the lives of others. There are at least two problems with this argument. First, if you think about it, I think you'll agree that the premise is not very plausible. Most of us, anyway, think that we do have a right to interfere in the lives of others, at least some of the time. Typically, we think that we have a right to interfere in the lives of others if their actions have serious consequences for the rest of us. For example, we require drivers to get insurance, because it potentially affects others if they have an accident and are uninsured. And we have zoning laws, so that your next door neighbor cannot turn his house into a hog-rendering plant, with all the associated stench. So the premise will have to be modified to be plausible:

"Ethical relativism is true because we have no right to interfere in the lives of others, even if we disapprove of their actions, so long as their actions do not have serious negative consequences for the rest of us."

Even this version of the argument is a little problematic, because it is vague what counts as "serious consequences." But there is a more important problem with this argument: it is a non-sequitur. Even if the premise is true, it provides no evidence for the conclusion. You can probably see why for yourself if you compare it with the previous argument. Think of it like this. An ethical objectivist could just as easily believe that we have no right to interfere in the lives of others as could an ethical relativist. Indeed, an ethical objectivist could say that it is an objective matter of fact that we have no right to interfere in the lives of others.

The doctrine expressed by the premise of this argument is liberalism. Liberalism is the doctrine that one ought not interfere in certain classes of actions of others, regardless of whether one disapproves of them.¹¹  As we have seen, this is different from ethical relativism, but at first it might not seem all that different from moral isolationism. There is an important difference, though. Moral isolationism is the doctrine that we ought not pass judgment on others (if they are from cultures other than our own), while liberalism allows us to pass judgment on others, but asserts that (at least in certain cases) we ought not interfere in their actions.¹²

Notice, finally that ethical relativism does not entail liberalism, any more than liberalism entails ethical relativism. A cultural ethical relativist, for example, would say that, relative to the culture of Nazi Germany, it is false that we should not interfere in the actions of others if we disapprove of them. So liberalism and ethical relativism are completely unrelated logically.

The argument that I am about to give is similar to arguments that have been offered by the twentieth-century philosophers J.L. Mackie and Gilbert Harman.¹³ Their arguments, in turn, are deeply indebted to the work of the the 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume.¹⁴ However, the argument I'm going to give here is not precisely the same as any of their arguments, so you should read their works if you want to pursue this topic in more depth.

An Argument for Ethical Relativism

This argument begins with the premise that ethical claims are not purely descriptive, but are also normative, or evaluative, or prescriptive. "Evaluative" is a term I have already used to indicate what ethics is. But I need to say more about it now, because in order to understand the argument I'm going to give, you will need a strong, intuitive feel for what it means to say that a claim is evaluative, or normative, or prescriptive. This will be a little tricky, though, because different philosophers analyze normativity in different ways. In addition, I am not sure myself that it is possible to define "normativity." However, almost all philosophers (whether they are relativists or objectivists) think that there is some kind of interesting difference between claims that are purely descriptive and those that are normative. Consequently, I'm just going to try to stimulate your intuitions about normativity.

Consider a claim like, "2+2=4" or "A given volume of lead has more mass than the same volume of aluminum." Claims like these seem to be purely descriptive. That is, they merely state facts about the world. Purely descriptive claims do not, by themselves, tell us what to do, or tell us what not to do, or encourage or discourage us from doing certain things. Descriptive claims certainly can be relevant to our actions. If I want to build a boat, and I am trying to decide whether to make it out of lead or aluminum, the second claim above will be relevant to my decision. However, this claim about aluminum and lead is relevant to my actions only if I desire to build a boat out of one of those materials. In other words, it is logically possible to admit that a descriptive claim is true, yet to also hold that it is irrelevant to one's actions, because one happens to not have any desires or commitments that engage with that claim. The connection between a descriptive claim and our actions is contingent.

In contrast, an ethical claim seems to be intrinsically relevant to our actions, in the following way. If I admit that an ethical claim is true, then I seem logically committed to acknowledging its relevance for my actions. For example, if you admit that stealing is wrong, and you admit that what you are doing is stealing, then you have admitted, at the least, that there is a reason not to do what you are doing. This does not guarantee, of course, that you will stop stealing. People often do what they believe is wrong. But to admit the truth of an ethical claim is to admit its relevance to one's actions. Philosophers describe this feature of ethical claims by saying that they are normative, or evaluative, or prescriptive.

Here is another way to try to get at what normativity is. Imagine that you discover that a friend is cheating in school, and you confront him by asking, "Isn't it wrong to cheat?" Assuming your friend doesn't agree to stop cheating, I think he would probably say something like either, "No, it's not wrong, because the whole school system is stupid and unfair anyway," or "Yes, but I have to get A's to get into medical school." Now, I think these are both really lame responses, but they seem to me to be the kinds of excuses cheaters would give. The first response denies (mistakenly) that cheating is wrong; but such a person does not question that it would be relevant to his actions if cheating were wrong. The second response acknowledges that cheating is wrong, and also implicitly acknowledges the relevance of this fact; however, the person suggests (again, mistakenly) that there is some reason which outweighs the ethical consideration in this case. Either of these is the kind of thing that someone might say in real life, and both acknowledge the normativity of ethical claims.

But imagine that someone simply replied, "Yes, cheating is wrong. So what?" I think almost no one would actually say this. The response seems more like a joke than a real answer. But let's suppose, for the sake of the argument, that someone did say that. I think we would have to understand him in one of the following ways. (1) We might think he was just joking, or being ironic. But if he was joking, then he does not really think what he is saying is true. If the person is not joking, then (2) he might mean by what he said that, while everyone else says that cheating is wrong, he thinks that all talk about ethics is just crap. But then he doesn't really think it is true that cheating is wrong. All he thinks is that naive people falsely believe that some things are wrong, whereas he knows better.

In summary, it seems that ethical claims are normative: they do not merely state descriptive facts; they prescribe or endorse or encourage certain actions.¹⁵

Both ethical relativists and ethical objectivists generally agree so far. The disagreement comes when the anti-objectivist asks how it is possible for any claim to be normative. What is normativity, after all? How does normativity fit into "the fabric of the world"?¹⁶ Physics describes for us a universe of atoms, electrons, protons, neutrons, electromagnetic and gravitational fields, etc. Biology describes a world of living organisms with drives to eat, reproduce, etc. How does normativity fit into the natural world? The anti-objectivist answers that the only way to scientifically explain the normativity of ethical claims is in terms of how these claims engage a person's feelings, or passions, or commitments, or some such human psychological motivation.¹⁷ Thus, the source of the normativity which ethical claims seem to have is their necessary connection with human motivations (such as desires, passions, etc.).¹⁸
For example, say I agree with the claim that murder is wrong. This is an ethical claim, so it is normative. The anti-objectivist will say that what accounts for the normativity of an ethical claim is that, when I agree with the truth of the claim, I am implicitly acknowledging the existence of a motivation to act in accordance with that claim.

Here is another way of thinking about it. Recall my earlier suggestion that, if you acknowledge the truth of an ethical claim, you must admit its relevance to your actions. The anti-objectivist will explain this fact as follows: if you acknowledge the truth of an ethical claim you must admit its relevance to your actions because that ethical claim is true only if you are psychologically motivated to act in accordance with it. The truth of an ethical claim implies the existence of some motivation to follow that claim. Notice a further implication of this view: if there is no motivation to follow an ethical claim, then that claim is not true.
The third premise is one that I think almost all of us would agree with today: when it comes to ethical topics, people frequently do not share the same motivations (i.e., often one person has a certain motivation and another person does not have it, or has an opposed motivation). For example, some people find homosexuality disgusting, while others find it perfectly acceptable. Some people feel strongly that murderers should receive the death penalty, while others feel just as strongly that executing murderers is barbaric. Some people desire to prevent women from having abortions, while others desire just as much to ensure that women have the choice to have abortions. We could go on all day with additional examples.¹⁹

On the basis of the above premises, the ethical relativist concludes that all ethical claims are true or false only in relation to each individual person's particular viewpoint or perspective -- where "viewpoint" or "perspective" includes one's motivations. Can you see why this conclusion follows from the premises? The argument is that ethical claims are normative, and that what makes them normative is that the truth of an ethical claim implies the existence of a corresponding motivation. But people have different motivations regarding ethical issues, so ethical claims are true only relative to those who have the appropriate motivations. Thus, for example, if I lack the motivation to disapprove of stealing, then the claim that stealing is wrong will not be normative for me. But if it is not normative, then it cannot be true relative to me either, because a true ethical claim is always normative.

Counter-Arguments

The conclusion of this argument does seem to follow from the premises; the argument is not a non-sequitur. In addition, the first premise (about the normativity of ethical claims) seems plausible to me (and to most other philosophers), and the third premise (about the diversity of human motivations) seems just indubitable. So the only place to criticize this argument, I think, is the second premise:

The truth of an ethical claim implies the existence of some motivation to follow that claim; if there is no motivation to follow an ethical claim, then that claim is not true.

I could simply deny that this is true, but that denial would not be entirely satisfactory by itself. Can you see why? Premise two was motivated by the demand to explain what normativity is. If I simply deny premise two, the anti-objectivist will say, "Premise two explains what makes ethical claims normative. If you deny it, then what's your explanation of what normativity is?" And I owe the anti-objectivist some sort of response to this challenge.

So here is my explanation: Ethical claims are normative because the truth of an ethical claim implies the existence of a reason to act, or be, or feel in a certain way. I think that this actually does a better job of explaining the normativity of ethical claims, because it seems to me that ethical claims are not about what we, as a matter of fact, happen to do, or be, or feel; ethical claims are about what we should do, or be, or feel. And what we should do, or be, or feel depends on what we have a reason to do, or be, or feel.

So what I have done is to give a counter-argument to the relativist's argument by denying her second premise. And I have also responded to the challenge that motivated the second premise -- the challenge to provide an account of what normativity is. But ethical relativists will not be satisfied with this response. I think most of them would give something like the following counter-counter-argument:

You have provided an alternative account of normativity, but you have forgotten what considerations motivated the particular account of normativity that I gave. The challenge I presented was to explain how normativity is possible in the natural world as revealed by physics and the other sciences. My account of normativity makes it depend on natural entities like desires, passions, etc. How do the reasons that you refer to fit into the world revealed by science?²⁰

My answer to this challenge is to admit that the reasons and the normativity that I am talking about are not parts of the natural world as revealed by science.²¹ However, I think that there are "more things in Heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your" physics. This will seem superstitious and anti-scientific to some, but it seems to me that those who dispute this are committed to an implausible metaphysics.²² More specifically, I submit that what underlies the anti-objectivist's objection to my account of normativity is a commitment to reductive naturalism. Reductive naturalism is the metaphysical doctrine that all true claims are ultimately equivalent to claims of natural science, all real properties are ultimately equivalent to the properties that natural science countenances, and everything that exists is ultimately equivalent to the entities countenanced by natural science. In other words, according to reductive naturalism, natural science can, in principle, tell us everything there is to know about the world.

It seems to me, then, that the debate between ethical objectivists and ethical relativists really comes down to this metaphysical issue. If you accept reductive naturalism, then it is very hard to explain normativity in any way other than by appealing to motivations that humans have. And, as we have seen, once you explain normativity in terms of actual motivations, it is very hard to avoid ethical relativism (since people's motivations are evidently different). But if you deny reductive naturalism, then you can understand normativity as a non-natural property, and there seems to be no particular reason to regard this property as existing only in relation to particular people.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to definitively address the metaphysical issue of whether reductive naturalism is true. However, my own view is that there are clear counter-examples to reductive naturalism. That is, there are clearly truths which are not equivalent to truths of natural science, and properties that are not equivalent to natural properties. I shall conclude my discussion of this argument by presenting some examples, and discussing why I think they cannot be reducible to natural science.

Consider the colors of objects. A Granny Smith Apple is green. There is a natural property associated with that greenness. The property is called "spectral reflectance." The spectral reflectance of the surface of the apple determines which wavelengths of light are reflected by the apple. Light with this wavelength bounces off the apple, hits the rods and cones in my eyes, and sends a signal to my brain. All of these natural facts and properties are necessary in order for me to see that the apple is green. But the color of the apple -- its greenness -- is not identical with any natural property. It might be tempting to identify the color with the spectral reflectance of the surface of the apple. However, the following argument suggests that the color is not identical with the spectral reflectance. Imagine a Martian scientist who knew everything we humans know about spectral reflectance, but whose neurology was very different from ours, so that he (or it?) saw red where we see green. This Martian would interact with the spectral reflectance of the apple in all the ways that we do, but he would not see the colors as we do. Therefore, the color and the spectral reflectance cannot be identical. So it seems that while spectral reflectance and the wavelengths of light are natural things that science can study, color itself is something distinct from any natural property or entity.

Here is another example of a non-natural property: pain. As with perceiving colors, there are physical processes that are necessary in order for us to feel pain. Painful stimuli are detected by specialized neurons in the skin (called "nociceptors") that send a signal to neurons in the spinal cord. Neurons in the spinal cord, in turn, send a signal to the thalamus and other brain centers. Neurons in the thalamus then send a signal to the cerebral cortex.²³ We would not feel pain were it not for these physiological processes. However, the following argument suggests that the sensation of pain is not identical with any of these processes. Say we wrote down in a book absolutely everything there was to know about the physiology of pain. As long as this book were limited to the physiology of pain, there would be one important fact left out: what pain actually feels like. If it is possible to have a creature who could learn about science, but who does not feel pain, that creature could learn everything in that book -- everything about the physiology of pain -- but he would not know what it is like to actually feel pain.²⁴ But this suggests that a mental state like pain is not identical with any set of physiological (or more broadly natural) facts.²⁵

So far I have been focusing on what I claim are non-natural properties. Next, consider an example of a non-natural fact: 2+2=4. Indeed, any mathematical truth is a non-natural fact. Now, some people will immediately object that mathematics is a natural science, so mathematical facts are, by definition, natural facts. In whatever way we define "natural science," though, mathematical facts do seem to be importantly different from any other facts studied by science. Note, for example, that the entities discussed by mathematics do not exist anywhere in the natural world. Where in the natural world is the number 2? We can have a pair of things, of course, but the number 2 is not identical with any particular pair of items. In addition, mathematical entities do not seem to interact causally with things in the natural world. That is to say, the number 4 apparently cannot be causally affected by anything that happens in the natural world, and the number 4 does not itself causally affect anything in the natural world. (The same seems to be true, by the way, about colors and sensations like pain. None of these entities is part of the natural world of cause and effect.) This is not to deny that we can use mathematics to predict and explain many aspects of the natural world. However, mathematical entities and mathematical truths seem to be very distinct from natural entities and truths.²⁶

So I have given what I claim are three counterexamples to reductive naturalism (the doctrine that all true claims are ultimately equivalent to claims of natural science), and I have tried to explain why I think they are counterexamples. It would be foolish of me to suggest that I have definitively settled the issue in the space of a few paragraphs. There are smart philosophers out there who would reject my arguments, and who continue to be reductive naturalists. However, I hope I have shown that one cannot simply assume that reductive naturalism is true. And until we have good reason for accepting reductive naturalism, we have no reason for rejecting the suggestion that normativity is -- like colors, sensations, and mathematical properties -- a real but non-natural entity. Furthermore, it is worth keeping in mind that no philosopher has ever succeeded in producing a reductive naturalist account of pain, color or mathematics that has convinced the majority of philosophers.

So far, I have examined an argument in favor of ethical relativism, and attempted to explain what I think is wrong with it. However, it is important to recognize that explaining what is wrong with an argument for the truth of a given position is not the same as presenting an argument for the falsehood of that position. This probably seems a little abstract, so here is a concrete example. Say you present an argument that taxation is always unjust. Even if I completely demolish your argument, that would not by itself show that taxation is not unjust. I would need a separate argument to show that. Consequently, even if my criticisms of arguments in favor of ethical relativism are good, I still have not shown that ethical relativism is false. So, I shall now discuss one bad argument in favor of ethical objectivism, and three arguments that I think are good ones in favor of ethical objectivism.

"Ethical relativism is false because people can be mistaken about ethics."

If you reflect on it, I think you'll see that the premise here is very plausible. I think all of us, at one time or another, have acknowledged an ethical error. (The alternative is that we are all ethically infallible, which seems like an arrogant assumption.) However, this is still a bad argument, because ethical relativism does not mean that we are never in error. Consider subjectivism. Subjectivism, you will recall, holds that ethical claims are true or false only in relation to each individual person's perspective. But this is not the same as saying that every particular ethical belief of each individual is true. For example, say I believe that stealing is wrong, but it never occurs to me that there is anything wrong with taking a big box of envelopes from my place of work to use to mail my personal letters at home. I might not realize that taking envelopes from work for my personal use is stealing, but it is. So, even relative to my own perspective, my belief that it is okay to take the envelopes home is false.

Now I am going to present three arguments in favor of ethical objectivism. I am going to begin with the argument that I think is the easiest for the non-specialist to appreciate, and then move on to what I think are more and more subtle arguments.

The Argument from Humility

The first premise of what I shall call "The Argument from Humility" is that I can be fundamentally mistaken about ethical matters. By "fundamentally mistaken," I mean mistaken not just in applying some of my basic moral principles, but mistaken about my most basic ethical beliefs. Are there any reasons for believing that this premise is true? I can think of at least two reasons. First, many of us have had the experience of having a fundamental ethical belief that we later discovered was mistaken. For example, some people felt strongly when they were young that homosexuality is wrong, or that women shouldn't perform traditionally masculine jobs, but later came to believe that their own earlier belief was mistaken. If you have had any experience like this, in which you came to believe that you were mistaken about some fundamental ethical belief that you once held, then you are committed to the premise that you can be fundamentally mistaken about ethical matters. The second reason for accepting the first premise is that it seems to follow from a commitment to humility. To deny that I can be fundamentally mistaken about ethical matters seems arrogant, for it suggests that I am somehow infallible when it comes to ethics. So there are reasons based on both our experience of our own fallibility and also based on a general commitment to humility for believing that I can be fundamentally mistaken about ethical matters.

One implication that seems to follow from the first premise (perhaps with some other plausible assumptions) is that other people can be fundamentally mistaken about ethical matters. This seems plausible (given the first premise), because there does not seem to be anything special about me (or you) that makes us prone to fundamental error in a way that other humans are not.

Now, we saw earlier (when considering a bad argument against ethical relativism) that the ethical relativist can allow for certain kinds of errors. For example, an ethical subjectivist can admit that he was wrong in a particular action or belief, because that action or belief turns out to be inconsistent with his own principles or his own fundamental point of view. However, ethical subjectivism cannot acknowledge that a person can be fundamentally mistaken about ethical matters. According to ethical subjectivism, whatever an individual's fundamental ethical beliefs are, they cannot be mistaken. But this is inconsistent with our first premise. Therefore, ethical subjectivism is false.

In other words, the argument is that, although subjective ethical relativism can allow for certain kinds of errors, it cannot do justice to the full extent of our fallibility as humans. We humans can be fundamentally mistaken in ways that ethical relativism does not recognize.

What about the other kind of ethical relativism: cultural ethical relativism? A similar argument can be used against cultural ethical relativism. It seems that a culture can be fundamentally mistaken about ethical matters. Why? First, it seems that cultures have been fundamentally mistaken in their ethical principles. For example, in the 17-century (and later) many Western cultures held that slavery could be ethically justifiable. But now these same cultures condemn slavery as a shameful ethical error in their past. In addition, cultural humility requires us to believe that our own culture can be fundamentally mistaken. But, if our own culture can be fundamentally mistaken, then surely other cultures can be as well. And then it follows that cultural ethical relativism is false, because such relativism does not admit that a culture can be fundamentally in error.

The Argument from the Hypothetical Imperative

"The Hypothetical Imperative" is a fancy name for a principle of reasoning that is really very common. (It is sometimes also called "instrumental rationality.") There are various ways to formulate the hypothetical imperative, but here is one: If you have a goal, then you ought to take the most efficient means for achieving that goal that are consistent with your other goals and with their comparative value. I'm sure this sounds complex and hard to understand at first, but this is actually a principle we appeal to all the time. Consider the following brief exchange:

Susan: "I'm going down to New York City tomorrow."
Jim: "How are you going to get there?"
Susan: "I'm taking the train."
Jim: "Why don't you drive down on the Taconic instead? It'll be quicker, and the ride is pretty."
Susan: "Yeah, but I hate driving in the city, so I would find it too much of a hassle to park the car once I got to New York."

In this dialogue, Susan makes clear that she has a goal (going to New York City) and a plan for achieving that goal (taking the train). Jim proposes an alternative means, on the grounds that it is more efficient (because quicker) and also helps achieve another goal that he assumes she has (having an enjoyable trip). Susan responds by pointing out another goal she has (avoiding driving and finding parking in the city), which she regards as more important than the goals she would promote through the alternative means Jim proposes.

I hope you'll agree that this is a perfectly normal and comprehensible exchange. But notice that there is a general principle which is invoked (probably unconsciously) by both parties to this discussion: the hypothetical imperative. This principle is widely accepted. Indeed, even most anti-objectivists accept it.²⁷ But anti-objectivists seem not to have noticed that, if the hypothetical imperative is true, there is at least one objective value in the universe. It might seem that the hypothetical imperative only refers to subjective or relative value, because it evaluates actions based on what goals an individual person happens to accept. But the "ought" of the hypothetical imperative is not relative to the perspective or viewpoint of the individual. In our example above, it is not true only from Susan's perspective that she ought to take the train. It is true from Jim's or anyone else's perspective -- objectively true -- that Susan ought to take the train (given her goals). Susan is objectively in error if she fails to take the train, because she would not be promoting her own peace of mind and happiness if she drives instead.

Consequently, if you accept (as almost everyone does) the hypothetical imperative, then you must acknowledge at least one objective value in the world. But then anti-objectivism is simply false. At this point, the anti-objectivist might acknowledge the existence of the values implied by the hypothetical imperative, but deny the existence of all other values. The problem with this move is that it seems ad hoc. The anti-objectivist's claim had been that objective values are implausible because of their objective normativity. Once he admits the existence of one kind of objectively normative fact, there is no reason not to believe in other kinds of value as well.

The Rational Argument Argument

Let us turn now to what seem like purely descriptive claims. Pick any descriptive fact that you think is true, and for which you think there is compelling evidence, or a good argument for believing that it is true, or a convincing reason for believing it. For example, maybe you believe that objects like tables, chairs, and human bodies are made out of atoms, and that experimental evidence supports this; or that the various kinds of influenza are caused by viruses, and that this can be shown by using electron microscopes on blood samples; or that there was a major battle in Gettysburg during the 1860's, and that archaeological and testimonial evidence demonstrates this. How is the evidence, or argument, or reason for the truth of the claim related to the claim? The fact that evidence is compelling, or that an argument is good, or that a reason is convincing, does not guarantee that it will persuade every other person. Some people are not good at appreciating arguments, or are simply dogmatic. Instead, what makes evidence compelling, or an argument good, or a reason convincing, is that a person ought to be persuaded by it. But notice what has crept into our discussion of the justifications for believing descriptive truths: an evaluative fact, represented by the word "ought." Even if there are some claims that are themselves purely descriptive, any rational argument we give in favor of accepting those claims, whatever its logical form, will be prescriptive or evaluative, because the argument will tell us what we should or ought to believe. So, if you believe that there is any good argument for any conclusion, you accept at least one evaluative fact.

We have covered a lot of ground in this paper. We began by examining the various kinds of relativity: cognitive and ethical, cultural and subjective. I said that I would focus on ethical relativism, and especially subjectivism, for the purposes of this paper. We identified objectivism (or realism) as one alternative to relativism. We then saw that relativism cannot be obviously true (or else it would not have been denied by so many great thinkers). Consequently, those who believe in it must offer some argument in its favor. There are many bad arguments in favor of ethical relativism. We examined two such bad arguments, which turned out to be non-sequiturs. Then we looked more closely at what many philosophers have thought is a good argument in favor of ethical relativism. This argument turns on the demand to explain the "normativity" of ethical judgments in a naturalistic way. I offered some counter-arguments to this argument, and before we knew it we were in the midst of metaphysical discussions.

In the final section of this paper, we looked at one bad argument and three possibly good arguments in favor of ethical objectivism. The first possibly good argument claims that ethical relativism cannot account for the extent to which we are ethically fallible. The second and third arguments present examples of what seem to be objective evaluative facts that, I suggest, even relativists are committed to.

Let me stress again that you are not obligated to agree (or to disagree) with any particular argument in this paper. But make sure that, whatever you end up believing, you understand clearly and distinctly what it is that you believe, and you can understand and respond to arguments for and against your beliefs.

Notes

^{1 Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 25. Although I agree with this particular comment, I do not agree with everything Professor Bloom says in this book.}

^{2 Some philosophers use the terms "ethical" and "moral" interchangeably. Other philosophers think of "ethical" as a broader term than "moral." Such philosophers hold that morality is limited to discussions of right and wrong, particularly in relation to actions that directly affect other people, while ethics is about evaluations in all areas of one's life, including one's lifestyle. For one discussion of this distinction, see Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), especially chapter 10, "Morality, the Peculiar Institution."}

^{3 Some philosophers distinguish ethical evaluations from aesthetic evaluations. Aesthetics is concerned in particular with evaluations of beauty and ugliness. However, I am not going to carefully distinguish ethics from aesthetics here because ethical relativists are almost always also aesthetic relativists.}

^{4 An objection like this was first formulated by Plato in his dialogue, the Theatetus (Stephanus 170e ff.). (There was a famous edition of Plato's dialogue edited by a man whose Latin name was "Stephanus." Almost all translations of Plato give the Stephanus pagination in the margin, so that you can locate the same passage in any of them.)}

^{5 See Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978), and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), especially chapters X and XII and the Postscript, sections 5-6.}

^{6 Notice that I put "claims" in scare-quotes, because we usually think of claims as asserting something, and hence as being either true or false. A classic statement of emotivism may be found in A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1952; o.p. 1946), Chapter VI: "Critique of Ethics and Theology." A more recent (and more sophisticated) statement and defense of a related position may be found in Allan Gibbard's Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). (Be forewarned that Gibbard's book is hard for beginners, though.)}

^{7 Some philosophers distinguish objectivism and realism, but I will use them interchangeably in this paper. Ethical realism and ethical objectivism are sometimes also called "moral realism" and "moral objectivism." "Objectivism," written with a capital "O," is also a name for the philosophy of Ayn Rand, but I am not using the term "objectivism" in that sense in this paper.}

^{8 Protagoras may have been defending both ethical relativism and cognitive relativism. It is an interpretation of Protagoras' doctrine that Plato discusses in his Theatetus (Stephanus 152a ff.), a dialogue which I mentioned in an earlier note.}

^{9 I am not stating that an ethical realist must agree with the premise. I am only saying that she could, consistent with remaining a realist, agree with the premise.}

^{10 This was originally published in Midgley's Heart and Mind, but it has been reprinted many times, such as in Christina Sommers and Fred Sommers, eds., Vice & Virtue in Everyday Life, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1993), pp. 174-180.}

^{11 In contemporary U.S. political discourse, "liberal" is often used to mean "left of the political center." However, properly speaking, liberalism may be associated with either left or right wing doctrines. For example, U.S. Republicans typically think that the "certain classes of actions" with which one may not interfere include individual and corporate decisions about spending and investing money, while U.S. Democrats typically think that the "certain classes of actions" include choices of personal lifestyle.}

^{12 The "Prime Directive" on Star Trek is also an expression of liberalism.}

^{13 See Mackie's Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), especially chapter 1, and Harman's "Moral Relativism Defended," Philosophical Review 84 (1975), pp. 3-22. Mackie is clearly an anti-objectivist, but he does not say that he is a relativist. However, I think his position commits him to relativism whether he realizes it or not.}

^{14 Hume was not an ethical relativist; however, in Book III, Part I of his Treatise of Human Nature he gives some famous arguments which have inspired later ethical relativists. Philosophers still debate about both what Hume was trying to prove with his arguments and whether he succeeded in proving anything. For a sympathetic discussion of Hume, see J.L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (New York: Routledge Press, 1980).}

^{15 Hume seems to make a similar point when he says that morality " 'tis supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding. And this is confirm'd by common experience, which informs us, that men are often govern'd by their duties, and are deter'd from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impell'd to others by that of obligation." (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, eds. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1978], p. 457.)}

^{16 The phrase in quotation marks is from Mackie's Ethics, p. 15.}

^{17 I am going to be intentionally vague about what kinds of motivations humans have. Some people think that the only human motivation is desire. I think that is too narrow myself, but it doesn't make any difference to the present argument exactly what kind of motivations humans have.}

^{18 Hume seems to make a similar point when he says, "Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. ... The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. ... It lies in yourself, not in the object." (Hume, pp. 468-469.)}

^{19 You might be surprised to discover that this is where Hume would disagree. He apparently thinks that everyone has approximately the same basic passions. This is why Hume is an anti-realist but not a relativist.}

^{20 This is not a quotation from any particular relativist, but rather a hypothetical argument that I think is much like one many relativists would give.}

^{21 There actually are accounts of reasons which try to make them part of the natural world. For example, Donald Davidson has argued that a reason for action is a combination of a belief plus a "pro-attitude." (See his "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," in his Essays on Actions and Events [New York: Oxford University Press, 1982], pp. 3-19.) Gilbert Harman also presents a "Humean" account of reasons for actions in his "Moral Relativism Defended." However, I want to avoid these sorts of accounts because I think they would end up supporting ethical relativism. (Can you see why?)}

^{22 Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that deals with the issue of what kinds of entities exist at the most general level, and of how these entities are related to one another. More specifically, metaphysics deals with the kinds of issues we discuss in the next few paragraphs.}

^{23 I am indebted to Professor Stephen J. Clark of Vassar's Psychology Department for explaining the physiology of pain to me. Of course, Prof. Clark is not responsible for any errors I may have unintentionally introduced into the account he gave me.}

^{24 Actually, there are a handful of humans who are congenitally incapable of feeling pain. These people could be brilliant neuroscientists, who knew everything there is to know about the physiology of pain, but they would still not know what pain feels like, which suggests that the pain is not identical with any neurological fact.}

^{25 The arguments in this paragraph owe much to the work of many previous philosophers. The 17th-century philosopher Rene Descartes presented some of the major arguments for what is now called "the mind-body distinction" in works like his Meditations on First Philosophy. More recently, Thomas Nagel has written an article (often used in introductory philosophy classes) arguing for the separation of mind and body: "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" originally published in his Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 165-180.}

^{26 Plato was one of the first to argue that mathematical truths are not truths about the natural world. See, for example, his Republic. For a more recent, and very readable, defense of a sort of Platonism, read Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997; o.p. 1912), especially Chapter IX, "The World of Universals."}

^{27 J.L. Mackie explicitly endorses it in his Ethics, for example.}