

consequently be understood as enactments of imagination. Bates focuses in particular on the transition from revealed religion to absolute knowing and from hard-hearted moral judgment to forgiveness, to clarify the transition from representation to thought proper. Bates concludes that imagination is not present in the *Phenomenology* as an isolated content but is, rather, the entire form of that work.

This book is convincing in its demand that the place of imagination in the *Phenomenology* be determined, and the using of Hegel's theoretical accounts of imagination in the *Philosophy of Spirit* lectures to establish an interpretive framework seems a sound method. Because the book endeavors to cover so much textual material, the treatments of Hegel's complex arguments are often rather formal, but the overall thrust of the analysis is clear and plausible enough. Chapters 2 and 3 are tenacious and complex in their efforts to make sense of fragments 17 and 20, two small but important pieces of Hegel's writing, and these two chapters may be the strongest part of the book, not so much because of the precise details of the analyses, but because they demonstrate the form any successful interpretation of Hegel must take.—John Russon, *University of Guelph*.

BORRADORI, Giovanna. *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 224 pp. Cloth, \$25.00; paper, \$15.00—A book entitled *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida* sounds promising. Here we find two philosophers whose views are normally regarded as diametrically opposed, contemplating the threat that is permeating our lives today: 9/11 and its aftermath.

However, the book, with its promising title, is in many ways disappointing. You may have expected to find a rare discussion between Habermas and Derrida, but there is no dialogue at all. Instead we are presented with two separate fairly short interviews conducted by Giovanna Borradori in New York just after 9/11. The interview with Habermas comprises twenty pages and the one with Derrida fifty-two pages. The rest of the book is written by the interviewer Borradori herself, who compares and contrasts Habermas's and Derrida's positions in a rather didactic fashion. Considering that both interviews are easy to follow, such detailed commentary seems rather superfluous, although it may be of help to readers who are not familiar with the thought of the two philosophers.

What may appear as striking—and is of particular interest to Borradori—is the manner in which these interviews reveal a close proximity of two thinkers who are generally regarded as having opposing views. According to Borradori, Habermas is usually regarded as a thinker of the Enlightenment, while Derrida is seen as an anti-Enlightenment thinker. Yet the interviews reveal that both philosophers regard themselves as thinkers of the Enlightenment. Indeed, both understand

9/11 within the context of and as a response to the project of the Enlightenment. In their eyes, 9/11 poses a philosophical problem which calls for a philosophical response.

Habermas, for example, interprets fundamentalism as a modern phenomenon. It has to be understood within the context of modernity which advocated the separation of state and religion and thus facilitated religious pluralism. According to Habermas, fundamentalism is not only in cognitive dissonance with modern life—insofar as it seeks to uphold the strict universalism of its faith—but is itself a product of modernity because the division of state and religion went hand in hand with the loss of normative ideals. Fundamentalism is a response to this loss and to widespread nihilism. It is a symptom of the malaise of modernity.

Similarly, Derrida interprets 9/11 as a symptom of modernity when he refers to its autoimmunitary process. Autoimmunity refers to the manner in which we tend to destroy our own protection. According to Derrida, 9/11 has to be understood as a continuity of the Cold War; a war which was entirely virtual. However, though virtual, it had serious consequences. For example, it led the U.S. to fund Islamic Afghan fighters during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, many of whom later formed the Taliban regime. The autoimmunitary process since 9/11 has even more serious consequences than the one during the Cold War. Whereas the latter could guarantee a balance of power between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., no such advantage exists today. Today's threat does not come from one particular state or partisan movement but from incalculable and disseminated forces. The forces of terror have thus turned elusive. Indeed, Derrida reminds the reader that "terrorism" is a slippery concept: terrorists for some are often (later) regarded as freedom fighters. The distinctions between war and terrorism, state and nonstate terrorism, national and international terrorism are not necessarily as clear-cut as we are made to believe. Derrida points to a well-known problem: we tend to promote what we fear. The more the West alerts us to possible terrorist threats, the more these play into the hands of the terrorists. The West produces what it, in turn, rejects; this is what Derrida means when he refers to autoimmunity.

Borradori is not mistaken when she detects a clear proximity between both thinkers. They both understand 9/11 as a distinctly modern problem and attempt to articulate a philosophical response. Both believe that the only way out of this modern malaise is to overcome nationalism and to allow for the institutionalization and enforcement of international law. Yet, this shared view is in no way surprising or new. It does not prove that a rapprochement has taken place or that their thinking has changed. They always have shared the view that politics cannot be divorced from philosophy and that we need to read philosophical problems with respect to the tradition of the Enlightenment. In this manner, they are and always have been thinkers of the Enlightenment. Indeed, it is precisely this view that turns them into so called Continental philosophers. Their disagreement merely stems from the question of how we should respond to the project of the Enlightenment. For Habermas the Enlightenment is an unfinished project which can only be

achieved if we adopt a more substantive notion of reason. Derrida, in turn, believes that we are only truly enlightened thinkers if we allow for the possibility of the Enlightenment's own overthrow.

This view is reiterated in the interviews. Their disagreement comes to the fore most clearly when we look at the way in which each addresses the question of how a cosmopolitan legislation and jurisdiction can be achieved without masking particular interests in universalistic disguise. Habermas has faith in the role of the U.N. and believes that the institutionalization of international law can be achieved only if the concept of tolerance is fostered. However, like Derrida, he is aware that this is not an unproblematic concept since the traditional concept of tolerance is essentially paternalistic in nature. It holds the paradoxical position that there cannot be freedom for the enemies of freedom. Habermas believes that we can overcome this paradox by refusing to determine the boundaries of what is tolerated one-sidedly. "On the basis of the citizens's equal rights and reciprocal respect for each other, nobody possesses the privilege of setting the boundaries of tolerance from the viewpoint of their own preferences and value-orientations" (p. 41).

Derrida, in turn, is less optimistic. He believes that no matter how hard we try to redefine the concept of tolerance, it inevitably fosters intolerance, since it is always seen as a form of charity. True tolerance can never be achieved—it merely leads to repression and, in its most aggressive form, to fundamentalism. In Derrida's eyes hospitality needs to replace the concept of tolerance. Unlike tolerance, unconditional hospitality sets no limits. "Hospitality *itself* opens or is in advance open to someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whoever arrives as an absolute foreign *visitor*, as a new *arrival*, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other" (pp. 128–9). Hospitality is not a form of invitation. It should be understood as visitation where we are open to the unexpected before we even choose to be open.

What Habermas and Derrida each envisage is both similar and distinct. Habermas idealizes the idea of world citizenship. He expresses trust in the legitimizing power of international organizations and in liberal democracy. Relying on his notion of an "ideal speech situation," he believes that what should be tolerated cannot be monologically established but can only be dialogically achieved. Derrida, in turn, places his hopes in a "Europe to come" in which it will be possible to establish international rights without a world government. Such a Europe "consists precisely in not closing itself off in its identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way towards what it is not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other" (p. 171).

So while one promotes reason or reasonableness in its dialogical form, the other believes that the only hope lies in allowing for the possibility of the emergence of the unexpected which may even undermine our "reasonableness." Readers familiar with Habermas's and Derrida's works will not be surprised by their respective positions. Their philosophical stance is merely reiterated in these interviews. Michel Foucault once observed that "we should free ourselves from the intellectual blackmail of 'being for or against the Enlightenment'" (*The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rainbow [London: Penguin Books, 1984], p.

45), and indeed these interviews make visible why such labels are of no consequence: they will never help us to grasp the true difference between Habermas's and Derridas's thought and only lead us to detect rapprochements where there are none.—Lilian Alweiss, *Trinity College Dublin*.

BRADSHAW, David. *Aristotle East and West. Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiv + 279 pp. Cloth, \$75.00—Under a wide-ranging title, Professor Bradshaw examines the history of the metaphysical concept of *energeia*, in an attempt to trace the development of theology in Byzantine Christianity and in the West. Our culture, he believes, operates under the assumption that the two theological traditions are not in harmony, although they share the same heritage in classical culture. The first part of the book is a toilsome investigation of the use of *energeia* in Aristotle's writings: as *dynamis* is acquiring the meaning of all sorts of capacity, *energeia* begins to be used in later texts also in the sense of static actuality, so there is a widening of meaning from activity to actuality. Bradshaw prefers to consider the First Mover of *Metaphysics* 12 as both a final and an efficient cause, a position, however, which is far from certain. He argues that "Thought of thought" cannot be typical of God, since it can also be said of the human mind (p. 36). But he overlooked that God's thinking is identical with his being which is his object.

After Theophrastus, *energeia* passed into neglect among the Peripatetics, but the notion of an activity that is at once restful and creative continued to fascinate philosophers up to the time of Plotinus (p. 64), who used *energeia* to explain how things can come forth from the One, *energeia* becoming a sort of "emission." One of Bradshaw's theses is that this concept was transformed into that of the Thomistic *esse*. This theory, however, does not agree with the secondary place assigned to being in Neoplatonism.

In Jamblichus, *energeia* means divine power man can participate in (p. 146). In Christian authors as well as in Eunomius the term has different shades of meaning. For Gregory of Nyssa, the divine names signify operations (*energeiai*). Divine simplicity on the one hand, a plurality of names on the other, created a problem for theologians. The Cappadocian Fathers identified God's being with his operation (p. 170). After some pages on Dionysius the reader finds a fine exposé of the spiritual theology of St. Maximus, which, however, has little to do with the central theme of the book. According to St. John Damascene, the divine "irradiation" is one, but it is diversified in divisible things (p. 209), a position which agrees with that of St. Thomas.

With St. Gregory Palamas we are back to a certain confusion as to how to reconcile divine simplicity with a multiplicity of names and effects. One might be reminded of the fine solution in *Summa theologiae* 1.13 where the infinite riches of God's being makes us use a plurality of